About the perennial problem of the relationship between body and mind raised so long ago by Aristotle (2), Kant said-"If I am asked where the soul is in the body, I begin to suspect something crooked in the question". Then, with a touch of mischief I think, he remarked that it "resides in a place of a smallness impossible to describe" ( 15) . It is the purpose of this paper, ambitious as it may be, to examine recent thinking on the question, though couched in more explicit terms. How to account, in the light of certain current scientific concepts, for the experience of an emotion, an idea, a mental image, in relation to the physiological processes that are concomitant with it. This is a theoretical paper -unashamedly theoretical. It seems necessary to be defensively emphatic about that because all too often in medical circles we hear it implied that only the practical is important, that to be theoretical is to be unpractical. To assume some inherent antithesis between theory and practice is, of course, a misconception. What 'works' is certainly all important in the practice of medicine. But how it 'works' is the essential business of the science of medicine. Theory -the 'how-it-works' -is the Alpha and Omega of science, of all scientific research. To this main business of science all the tests, trials, studies of 'what works' are relatively incidental.
In psychiatry we are at much disadvantage in lacking cohesion in the theoretical basis of our practice in comparison with other branches of science. Our colleagues in the other branches would seem to be more justified in being skeptical of our psychiatry than we are in so readily explaining away their attitude as 'resistance' to our insights. The difficulties in consolidating our theoretical basis lie first, and most obviously, in its having to cover two seemingly essentially different sets of natural phenomena -the physical and the psychological. A psychological phenomenon is always more than a physical phenomenon, however inextricably it may be related to it. It is a psychological phenomenon by virtue of its having qualities of awareness and motivation which are of a different order from the physical. Eccles, in his book The Neurophysiological Basis of Mind (7) , asserts "for the scientist there should be no doubt that the problem of interaction of mind and matter is a real problem and not a pseudoproblem arising from confusions in the usage of words". The theoretical framework of psychiatry has to stand on a base which extends far beyond the secure confines of the physical sciences -a base which, furthermore, is not of a uniform character. This is the first difficulty.
The second follows from it. By the traditional scientific method, the validity of psychological theory is barely comparable to that of biological theory. This discrepancy makes the integration of well-validated theory with poorly-validated theory, seem premature.
Then, psychodynamic theory, lacking the security of validation, remains diversiform. Where biological theory can present a unified physical concept of man, psychology presents a wide variety of personality theories. In entertaining the hope of consummating a union, biological science is confronted with an intriguing choice of fickle consorts-a rather exotic harem. No branch of medicine except psychiatry has to contend with such a choice of basic theory.
Desirous of the staid orderliness of monogamy, doctors schooled in the biological tradition of medicine would be expected to favour one psychological theory of personality to the exclusion of others, and one which is couched in terms close to those of biological science. They would select one which, for one thing, views personality difficulty as an illness. It is this position that has been provocatively challenged by Szasz in his book The Myth of Mental Illness (30) .
It is no wonder, then, that Freudian theory has found such favour with doctors concerned with psychological medicine. Psychiatrists who, after the tradition of medical practitioners, tend to eschew theoretical inquiry, have shown a zeal reminiscent of bigotry in religion and with it a summary disdain for 'any other gods' in adhering to this particular theoretical framework. Being deliberately 'biologically based' it gives a semblance of an integration of physiological and psychodynamic concepts -a semblance which barely stands up to close scrutiny.
What it offers is a dualistic parallelism rather than a synthesis. "Freud could himself apparently never shake off the shackles of classical Cartesian dualism" (29) , and those who have adhered strictly to the Freudian tradition have not succeeded either. Elsewhere in psychiatry, with this dualistic approach, there is still talk of 'bridges' between two disparate entities. For example, Dennis Hill said, at the Second Oxford Conference of the Mental Health Research Fund on "Stress and Psychiatric Disorder" (12), -"The gap between psycho-social phenomena and physiological phenomena remains a: wide one and it looks as if the bridge which must be built will remain a formidable undertaking". We still hear talk of 'interaction' which stresses too much the acting of one thing upon another in a linear causal relationship. A striking but subtle re-emphasis of the dualistic position is demonstrated in that recent book by Szasz (30) . We have not progressed satisfactorily by this approach.
But have we progressed further by the monistic approach? With this, alternatively termed the holistic approach, the physical and psychological are regarded as different aspects of the same phenomenon, the difference lying essentially in the observer rather than in the object observed. This view seems for many to be too facile. It should lead us to describe the individual in terms which are truly ambivalent (in the literal sense, not with the special connotations given by psychiatry) -in terms which are interchangeable between the different sciences. But to describe behaviour as "simply a totality of the outward reaction of the living being" (13), or to assert that "we. speak of functions of the organism as a unit" (19) , or that "homeostasis and goal-seeking are the same thing" (8) , exposes more ambiguity than ambivalence. We have not progressed far by this monistic approach.
Recognizing with Schrodinger (23) that the relationship between physiological and psychodynamic processes is "not only one of the tasks, but the task of science, the only one that really counts", and with William James that scientific achievement here would be one "before which all past achievements would pale", there have been instituted within the last decade some interdisciplinary conferences of considerable importance. In 1953 the Laurentian Conference on Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness (1) was arranged by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. Then, starting in 1950, there were several annual conferences under the auspices of the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation on Problems of Consciousness. More recently, there have been the annual conferences under the chairmanship of Doctor Roy Grinker, Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behaviour (9) . In reviewing their reports and other recent contributions to the literature from a variety of sources beyond our own field, we can see some significant advances towards clarification in the understanding of this extremely complex and illusive problem. Three are mentioned here.
First, the concept of the organism as an entity. The term 'organism', as commonly used, implies a biological, organic, mat~ria~, tangible, structural entity. The attributing of mental aspects of behaviour to the organism is facilitated when it is c.onceive? as ha~ing a hierarchy of funcnons of mcreasmg complexity, after the manner of Papez (20) . We have but little difficulty in conceiving of the hierarchial progression -from atomic 'particle' to molecule, from single cell to multicellular organism, through cell differentiation towards diverse functions within the organism. We can conceive of neural control and its increasing complexity along with the increasing differentiation of functions, calling sooner or later for purposes of functional economy, for the evolution of some transcendent type of neural control. It seems that it is here that consciousness emerges in deliberation and choice of action. Once the function of consciousness is achieved in the hierarchical progression, then the organism seems ready to elaborate as supreme this type of process, the elaboration ranging over the whole panorama of mental experience. The notion of transcendence here, emphasized by G.rinker, has t~be freed from any mystical connotations that are sometimes attached to it, as in religious philosophy. We are on solid biological ground here with the concept of metamorphosis which really embodies the notion of transcendence.
This entity concept of the organism was the cornerstone of Meyerian psychobiology (19) where it has not been searchingly examined. It has also been a cornerstone of Freudian psychology whe~e~t .has bee~incarcerated by reductionistic rea~omng a?d caricatured by ant~ropomorphlc terminology. It is too stanc a concept~o be te.nable in the light of modern phYSICS, whl~h. has definitely abandoned the mechanistic explanation of the Universe." On another scorethe recognition that the individual is so much the product of his environment -this organismic, unitary concept of man has had to be extended. As Watts has so simply pointed out in his discussion of Science and N ature (31) that although "the skin divides the body from the res~of the world as one thing from ?t~ers 10 thought but not in nature," it IS 10 nature. that "the skin is 'as much a jo~ner as a divider, being, as it were, the brIdge whereby the inner organs have co~tact with air, warmth and light". The umtary concept of man has been extended again by John Dewey and A. F. Bentley by regarding the organism and the environment as a unit in space and time and conceiving of it, more acceptably to the modern concepts of physics, as an action system (6) . "Matter, even crude matter", Brain says (4), "is not what it was. It has turned into energy". The individual then can be seen as an action or energy system. The concept of the field as an energy system developed by Faraday, Maxwell an? Hertz in the nineteenth century, go1Og on to Einstein in the present century, has been usefully applied in psychology, first in the Gestalt school and later; and most notably, by Kurt Lew10 (18) .** The concept of the individual as an entity, then, gives place to that of a process. No longer do we have to strugglẽ o fit the round peg of mind as an entity into th~square hole of body as an entity. But this attempt of man to conceive of hiIT,'self objectively in process is, as Grinker (10) pointed out, extremely difficult. Scott (24) has emphasized this difficulty in his discussion of the body scheme. This is eased somewhat by usi~g the concept of energy trans-c~IOn as developed in field theory. And It IS a concept which can be applied inter-.0"9",e of the great stages in the evolution of SCIentific thought was reached in recent years, when t:!'e. mechamstic explanation of the universe was definitely abandoned". (Sullivan, 28) .
oOD<;utsch c~utioned that "It is the method of representing reahty and not the actual physical concepts. and facts themselves that have been incorporated in psychology". (5) changeably between physics and psychology. Freud seized upon the concept of 'psychic energy' and developed psychodynamic theory in terms seemingly corresponding to those of physics. But, as Ruesch (22) pointed out, "The foundations of psychoanalysis were laid in the same scientific period with the theories of classical economics and both alike reflect the physics of the 1850's. In that period, the Law of Conservation of Energy (the First Law of Thermo-Dynamics) . . . dominated the trends of orthodox thought ... the whole train of thought connected to the Second Law of Thermo-Dynamics . . . is ignored by psychiatrists to the extent that while the word 'energy' is daily on their lips, the word 'entropy' is almost unknown to them". Ruesch is here overlooking the fact that Jung (14) embodied the principle of entropy in his psychology. The Second Law of Thermo-Dynamics has certainly found a correspondence, although not explicitly, in the medical concept of homeostasis propounded by Claude Bernard and developed by Walter Cannon. Field theory helps us to free ourselves from the shackles of causal determinism -the over-simplified notion of 'cause and effect' as if in a linear progression. Thus it helps to free us from the fruitless search for 'the cause' of schizophrenia in biochemical transformation, or in social interaction, or in 'intra-psychic' dynamisms. Causality is no longer seen as linear but circulara circularity within a field of energy transaction.
The third advance in the clarification of our thinking emanates from this point as the concept of energy transaction as applied in information theory. Lewin (18) conceive.d of energy transaction as serving a communicative function. The principle of feed-back in cybernetics could find ready application both in the physiological concept of homeostasis and the psychological concept of adaptation. It sheds light on the function of consciousness. This had been anticipated by William James before cybernetics emerged as a scientific discipline. As Knox (16) pointed out, James' "study of the distribution of consciousness shows it to be exactly such as we might expect in an organ added for the sake of steering a nervous system grown too complex to regulate itself". To this Kubie (17) added that "the very words that James uses in this connection are interesting premonitions of our current concern with self-steering mechanisms".
The progress in our thinking in this direction is well summarized by Rapaport (21) in a contribution to the Second Conference Touiards a Unified Theory of Bebaoiour: "Before the concept of energy was well known, there was another concept -namely that of forceand the organism was seen as simply transforming one kind of force into another. Levers, muscles, etc., can be seen as purely mechanical devices without any transformation of energy being considered, which is a purely anatomical view. Then the classical physiologists of the nineteenth century interpreted the organism as an engine for the transformation of energy much as the technological counterpart of that time, the heat engine, which transformed energy from one form into another. Now a new concept is arising, namely that of information ... It can be roughly defined as a degree. of organization. The energy transform~tIOn in intellectual process may be minute but the transformation of information that accompanies it may be vast".
Here we see more clearly the function of consciousness. In Slater's words (27) , "when behaviour reaches a certain degree of complexity it will begin to have a conscious or mental aspect". The concept of consciousness has always been bound up with the concept of mind, often as synonymous. Nowadays, consciousness, the conscious mind, is no longer an entity but a process -a process that evolves at a certain high level of complexity of the nervous system, emerging as an eventually necessary function for purposes of direction and extra-personal communication.
Pavlov] used to extract fines from any student in his laboratory who used the word 'consciousness', such was his objection to it. But his objection was to the use of the term as if consciousness were an entity. Later he used the term himself, but as denoting a process -"unconscious chains of associated connections can be set up in an inhibited field" and "under favourable conditions, the unconscious synthesis may enter the field of consciousness" ( 17) . Watson and his adherents in the Behaviourist tradition were similarly repelled by the concept of consciousnessbut as an entity. Interpreters of Freud, seemingly not as well versed as he in the Aristotelian-Thomist discipline of thought, have not been careful to observe the distinction between substance at.td attribute, between subject and predicate, consequently have tended to hinder the. advance of dynamic psychology by theIr. adherence t~an entity concept of consciousness and the unconscious'.
We are not out of the woods, however, when we change the connotation of consciousness from that of an entity to that of a process. There is still the danger of regarding consciousness as substance rather than attribute. We would avoid such confusion in our thinking if we used the word consciousness, like redness, only as an abstract noun denoting an attribute, not substance.tj At a certain point in a chemical reaction a solution may become red in colour. Comparably, at a certain point in an electro-physiological circuit, the individual may become conscious of a sensation, an emotion, an idea. The occurrence of redness depends not alone on the state of the chemical solution, although it never occurs apart from that state. The chemical reaction is the primary operation, the primary field of energy transaction, producing a chemical state tquoted by Kubie, L. S. (17) ttcf Kubie, L. S. in Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness (17) .
potentially red in colour. The substance for redness is in the chemical solution. But just as necessary as this for the colour to occur is a separate, additional set of phenomena -the presence of light waves impinging upon and reflected from the molecular configuration of the solutiona second process, a second field of energy transaction. This process can be described adequately in physical terms. But because it has a communicative function it could also be described appropriately in psychological terms.
Even given this second process, the experience of redness mayor still may not occur, depending on the presence of a third set of phenomena, a third field of energy transaction-the presence of an observer perceiving, by means of the secondary process (reflection of light from the solution), the effect of the primary process. This third state or field involves the exteroceptive activity of the observer with perception in consciousness. While some of this third process can be appropriately described in physical terms -electrophysiological nerve impulses, association pathways, and the like -a complete description requires psychological terms -perception, awareness, consciousness, for example.
We may say then, that redness is in the chemistry of the solution, but not in the solution alone. It is no less in the physics of the light impinging on the solution, but not in the light alone. It is no less in the psychophysiology of perception in the observer, but not in that alone. It is in all three together, but in none separately. It is in all three simultaneously or not at all.
Furthermore, we may say that the redness is an attribute to a particular physical state of the solution. It has its substance in the chemistry of the solution, it is conveyed, communicated by the physics of light, and actualized in the 'observer psychophysiologically. The redness, then, is that which is actualized in the observer, culminating in an extraphysical, a psychological phenomenon.
As we have conceived of redness as an attribute to a particular physical state of the solution, so we can conceive of consciousness as an attribute to a particular electrophysiological state of the nervous system.
As a particular example, we could take the consciousness of redness in the observer as he looks at the chemical solution. There is a primary process, relatively simple, a primary field of energy transaction starting with the stimulus-response activity of the optic nerve endings in the retina and going on to the transmission of nerve impulses via the optic nerves to the 'visual' area of the brain. And the consciousness of redness is in this primary field in that it never occurs without it, but not in this alone. Then, secondarily, there is the more complex activity involving the association circuits concerned with the 'interpretation', sorting, storing and relaying of the neural impulses as information-a communicative process by and large. And the consciousness is in this second field, but not in this alone. Beyond this there is the higher, more complex, activity of the brain that is concerned with finer discrimination, evaluation and deliberation, where consciousness becomes a functional necessity. It is here, given the primary and secondary processes, that the consciousness of redness is finally actualized.
As the redness, which is in the chemical solution and in the light waves reflected from it, is actualized in the perception of the observer, so consciousness, which is in the primary physiological process and in the secondary psychophysiological process, is actualized in this 'highest' activity of the brain. Thus consciousness is seen as the attribute of a certain neurophysiological state of the brain involving its three fields of operation. The primary field can be completely described in the physical terms of physiology, the secondary field can be described alternatively in physiological and psychological terms. The third field, the highest in complex-ity, calls essentially for extra-physical, psychological terms.
With this concept of consciousness, we might now attempt to draw up a schema to embrace the contributions to our thinking from field theory and information theory while remaining close to our primary biological, or rather biophysical, approach to the question of the nature of mind.
To do this we might conceive of three fields of operation-three fields of energy transaction in order of increasing complexity. Each we might identify by coining a special name.
With the concept of field of energy transaction replacing the now obsolete mechanismic notion of organism as an entity, the first comprises the relatively elementary operations completely identifiable in terms of physics and chemistry, or at least of physiology and biochemistry. This we might call the 'nuclear' field -an energy system simply in a physical context.
But in all creatures in which the nervous system is developed to the point where it serves a communicative as well as a locomotive function (18) where sensations occur, however elementary, there is a field of energy transaction much more extended and elaborate. It can no longer be completely described in terms of physical attributes alone; it must include the psychological attributes of proprioceptive and enteroceptive behavioural reactions, which serve purposes of intrapersonal communication. This we might call the 'intermediary' field (the word 'intermediary' is intended to have the double meaning of intermediate and mediating).
Given the more elaborate communicative aspect of this field, its function is still confined to the internal communicative operations of the individual. So the concept has to be enlarged to encompass that still more elaborate communicative activity which constitutes the interpersonal reactivity of life in society. Here the development of the exteroceptive function of the nervous system finds its place. Here the transformation of energy to the state of consciousness vastly elaborates the communicative function of the system now to include imerpersonal communication, deliberation, and the determination of action. This transformation to consciousness reaches a point of such autonomy that the communicative function of the system takes precedence over the locomotive and vegetative functions, and conscious deliberation can considerably determine the behaviour of the individual. This level of operation we might call the 'comprebensive' field, embodying the double meaning of all-inclusive and comprehending.
With this as a model, drawn on the lines of current theory in biophysics, we can see correspondence with not only one but various psychological theories of personality. Freudian psychology seems to be particularly amenable to revision along these lines. The most crucial issues lie in the areas of consciousness, energy transaction, and developmental metamorphosis. Despite the logical monstrosities that have mushroomed from the semantic artifacts of Freudian psychology, it is to Freud that much credit should go for discerning and focusing attention on just these problem areas where clarification could lead to a unified concept of behaviour.
Resume
L'auteur, dans cet article, entreprend l:~xam.en du perperuel probleme que pose I etablissement des rapports entre l'esprit et le corps, ala lumiere de certains concepts scientifiques courants tires de do-m~ines depassant ceux de la psychiatrie meme.
Les .difficultes que nous eprouvons a consohder nos principes rheoriques decoulent en premier lieu, et de la facon l~plus~vidente, du fait que ces prin-cIpes doivent couvrir deux [eux de phenomenes naturels, differant essentielleent d'apparence, les phenomenes phy-SIques et les r:henon:enes psychologiques. La seconde dlfficulte,c'est que, si 1'on se fie a la methode scientifique conventionnelle, la validite de la theorie psychologique est apeine comparable a celle de la theorie biologique, Enfin, au contraire des a.utr~s disciplines scientifiques, la psychiatric a recours a toute une variete d'hY,P0theses psychodynamiques pour expliquer les memes phenomenes fondamentaux.
. Le double parallelisme qui est imp licite dans la psychologie de Freud, bien qu'il soit generalement accepte, ne nous rapproche pas assez d'une solution de ce probleme, bien que 1'abord monistique conventionnel n'y ait pas reussi non plus.
Reconnaissant l'irnportance de ce probleme, plusieurs conferences interdisciplinaires ont ete convoquees depuis quelqu ' L ' es annees. auteur passe en revue ces r.apports ainsi que d'autres apports a la lltt.erature afin de decouvrir les progres qUI semblent avoir ete realises.
Le concept de 1'organisme comme entite, utile dans une certaine mesure, nous a per~s de constater I'emergence de la conscience comme un echelon biologique necessaire dans la hierarchie des systemes, Ce concept a toutefois cede Ia place au concept de 1'organisme comme processus, 1'attention ayant converge sur le champ comme systeme energetique. Ce concept a ete elabore dans un contexte physique par Faraday, Maxwell et Hertz au 1ge siecle, repris par Einstein au cours du present siecle, et developpe dans un contexte psychologique tout d'abord par l'ecole Ge~talt et ensuite et surtout par Kurt Lewin. Ici, Ia oausalite n'est plus I~neaire. mais circulaire. Le concept de I orgamsme comme processus est ensuite elargi par I'adoption des principes recents de Ia theorie de 1'information.
D,e cett~revue des concepts courants de I or~a~lsm~, on.p~opose que "I' esprit" pourralt etre ImaglOe comme mettant en cause trois champs d'echange d'energie par ordre croissant de cornplexite: (1) Ie champ "nucleaire" des operations re-I~tivement elementaires, systerne energetlque qui se trouve simplement dans un contexte physique; (2) Ie champ "interme?ia~re" de~reactions proprioceptives et lOteroCeptlves aux fins des communications interpersonnelles, systerne qui p~rticipe aIa fois du contexte psychologlque et du contexte physique; (3) Ie champ "complet" des communications plus elaborees, maintenant interpersonnelles et relevant beaucoup plus d'un contexte psychologique.
Pour c~nclure, I'auteur avance que, de cette maniere, no us pourrions mieux discerner la base commune des diverses t?~ories psyc~oIogi~ues de la personna-Ite, et, en arnver a un concept mieux IOtegre du comportement humain.
